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Barton: Essay--Affirmative Action: Making Decisions

ESSAY-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: MAKING
DECISIONS
THOMAS

D.

BARTON*

This essay is the result of a long intellectual and emotional
struggle with the idea of affirmative action. I say "struggle" because the difficulty of the problem often tempts one to abandon
the inquiry. However, all informed citizens should confront the
vital issues of the day, and about each issue there must ultimately
be some decision. This is mine about affirmative action. I offer it
not because I consider it the "right" decision. That would be both
presumptuous and an insult to the complexity of the problem.
Rather, I offer it as a way of thinking about affirmative action, in
the hope of making easier your own decisions.
Affirmative action programs give to certain persons special
consideration in matters of job hiring and advancement, or of enrollment in educational institutions. Such programs unquestionably intervene in our lives. This is so regardless of whether the
program is instituted by the government, by private employers, or
by colleges and professional schools. To be sure, the intervention
of affirmative action is a bit special in that it does not "extract"
actual resources from one group to give to another group. Rather,
it deprives some individuals of a potential benefit, or opportunity, in order to enhance the opportunities of others. One would
think this sort of "redistribution of potentials" to be much less
painful than the redistributions of actual wealth and interests in
property that occur in traditional social welfare programs. Quite
the contrary. Social welfare programs have been an accepted part
of our lives for decades, and while there constantly are calls for
reform, few persons dispute the legitimacy of the concept. No
such consensus, however, exists in support of affirmative action.
In fact, the issue has contributed largely to a splitting of the political alliance that initiated many programs of social welfare.1
* B.A., Tulane University, 1971; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974; Assistant
Professor of Law, West Virginia University.

' See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SFuousLy 224 (1977); Hofstadter, The Ca-

reer Open to Personality:The Meaning of Equality of Opportunityfor an Ethics
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Such fragmentation leads to the question: What is there about
affirmative action that causes such rancorous disagreement? I can
begin to answer that question only by asking three additional
ones: (1) What is the true nature of the problem? (2) Is the proposed remedy of affirmative action ethically justified? and (3)
Does affirmative action employ suitable techniques for achieving
its purpose?
I. THE

PROBLEM OF SocIAL DIsCRIMINATION

The problem both is, and is not, social inequality. Obviously
inequality is the root of our concern. But its eradication is not
necessarily the aim of programs of affirmative action. This is because of the unfortunate truth that society can never be perfectly
equal. Social inequality is spawned in too many diverse breeding
grounds for there ever to emerge a truly egalitarian society.2 Even
if that were not so, social inequality is measured by too many
different standards, which preclude any agreement on how the
equal society might be identified once it arrived. 3

of Our Time, in ASPECTS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 111, 123-24 (L. Bryson ed. 1956).

:1Commonly cited origins of inequality include human nature, war, or the existence of wealth or private property, see, e.g., M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW: STUDmS IN JURISTIC PHILOSOPHY 35, 36 (1950); the division of labor, or classes, see Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring'sRevolution in Science, in SocIETY, LAW AND MORALITY
269, 269-75 (F. Olafson ed. 1961); even law itself, see Dahrendorf, On the Origin of
Social Inequality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 42 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1972). No doubt all of the above contribute to the existence of social
inequality. See generally A. BETEI.LE, INEQUALITY AMONG MEN 1-23 (1977);
Dahrendorf, On the Origin of Social Inequality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND Socsizr 42 (P. Laslett & W.. Runciman eds. 1972).
- This difficulty in measurement exists because of a disagreement on what
constitutes an "equal" distribution. Some consider equality to exist with respect
to some commodity or right only if all persons possess a quantitatively equivalent
amount of it; others consider equality to be achieved if every person possesses a
"just" quantity of it, even though one person might have more of it than another;
others yet consider equality to be achieved with respect to the thing only if no
person in the society takes notice of how much of it is possessed by any other
person. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 440 (1961); See also Lee,
Equality of Opportunity as a Cultural Value, in ASPECTS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 255
(L. Bryson ed. 1956); See generally Benn, Equality, Moral and Social in III THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 38, 38-42 (P. Edwards ed. 1967); W. RUNCIMAN, RELATIvE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1966); D. THOMSON, EQUALITY 1-14 (1949);
R. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 58 (1938); Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSPHY,
POLITICS, AND SocIErY 85 (P. Laslett and W. Runciman eds. 1972); G. SARTORI,
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In a sense, then, social inequality is not the problem. It, like
the proverbial poor, will always be with us. The problem rather is
how the inevitable differences between people became translated
into higher or lower social positions. One thing is certain-"society," as such, does not cast people into higher or lower
social positions. People do that themselves by making discriminations. 4 "Society" is completely passive in this respect; ultimately
it "takes shape," i.e., becomes stratified, along the lines of the
most common discriminations made by its members. 5 Two other
things quickly become apparent. First, social discriminations are
not necessarily logical or reasonable or consistent or reflective of
true equality-they are simply inventions of the human imagination, limited in content only by the capacity of the mind to perceive differences. Second, although "society" does not actually

make the discriminations, "society" can, through its political and
legal mechanisms, intervene so as to create an environment that
tends to reinforce or obstruct people's discriminations.6

326-52 (1965).
A "discrimination" is a mental process by which a) differences are perceived
among people; and b) such differences are somehow evaluatively ranked. See Lee,
supra note 3, at 257.
5 This is somewhat of a simplification since as a "society" becomes stratified,
and particular people or attributes become more easily identifiably "superior" or
"inferior," no doubt further discriminations are facilitated by the ease with which
the information comes to be presented to the social members. Discriminations
that conform to existing social stratification become, therefore, more convenient
and "efficient." Moreover, one making a discrimination that conforms to existing
stratification is well-assured of being reinforced by the approval of his or her
peers: There may also grow up more formal socio-economic factors that induce the
continued making of the discrimination. It is even conceivable, of course, that a
society will employ its political and legal tools to enforce the existing social stratification. See generally BETEi.LE, supra note 2; R. BENDIX AND S. Li'sET, CLASS,
STATUS, AND PowEm SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1966).
6 "Society" can respond in four distinct ways to the discriminations committed by its members. First, it can institutionalize the discrimination by passing
legislation requiring the discrimination to be made. This response is not limited to
Hitlerian regimes; laws of exogamy based on racial features, for example, are fairly
common. Second, a society can ignore the discriminations being made by its members. Either actively or passively, both of the first two responses result in a society
that treats its least esteemed persons "worse-than-equally." Third, a society
through its legal or political tools can articulate general principles that prevent
people from acting on their discriminations in any manner that would further
lower the social esteem of the discriminated-against persons. This action, if enforced, is likely to prevent exaggeration of existing stratification. Within time, exDEMOCRATIC THEORY
4
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People make discriminations on the basis of all sorts of
things. Another's money, intellectual capacity, diligence, race, or
lineage-any of a virtually endless list of attributes-are susceptible to discrimination. We probably make dozens of discriminations with respect to each person we meet.7 The problem sought
to be remedied by affirmative action is that a large segment of our
population has made, and continues to make, particularly strong
discriminations that are completely irrational toward judging
human ability and human worth. This should not seem shocking;
no doubt many of the attributes that form the basis for our discriminations are irrational in the sense that the criterion on
which the discrimination is based has no empirical relation to
what is being measured or evaluated. This is regrettable because
it means we inevitably bring to our judgments of people some
isting stratification may even erode due to the gradual extinguishment of the discrimination. No affirmative steps are taken, however, to insure such
extinguishment. Such a society may be described as treating its least esteemed
persons "equally." See, e.g., Michaelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Conklin, The
Utilitarian Theory of Equality Before the Law, 8 OTTAWA L. REV. 485 (1976);
Wright, Liberty and the Common Law, 9 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 2 (1945); DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 227; M. BERGER, EQUALITY

BY

STATUTE: LEGAL CONTROLS OVER

GROUP DisCRIMINATION (1952). Finally, a'society might adopt affirmative measures
designed to erode existing stratification and to extinguish the discrimination that
causes it to endure. Such a society may be described as treating its least esteemed
members "better-than-equally." Such measures are the primary focus of this
paper.
7 It can at least be argued that people living in Western industrial societies
are more disposed to social discriminations than those who live, or did live, in
other societies. This is not necessarily because industrial man is more wicked or
irrational than people living in other societies. It is rather simply because industrial man tends to have a highly trained eye for detail and also a tendency towards
ordinal ranking. The origins of such tendencies are many, but perhaps classifiable
as "technical influences," "social influences," and "philosophical influences." The
"technical influences" stem from industrial production based on highly developed
division of labor, separation of tasks into discrete operations, interchangeability of
parts, and a decreased tolerance for variation of parts or labor. The "social influences" speak to a "model" of politics based on interest group pluralism; a "model"
of law based on the highly systemized and bureaucratized administration of precise standards and rules; and a "model" of economics based on discrete, precisely
symetrical, transactions. The "philosophical influences" include the widespread
use of the scientific method involving detached, close observation, reduction of
variables, and inductive theory making; pronounced separation of mind and matter; and a faith in causality. Cf. BETrILLE, supra note 2; Lee, supra note 3, at 25763; A.

WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD

1-22 (1929).
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measure of caprice and prejudice. Fortunately, many of our irrational discriminations are harmlessly frivolous, not taken by even
the discriminator as terribly serious or valid. Other irrational discriminations are taken very seriously and do result in judgments
that can be described as both erroneous and unjust. But no one
hopes by social intervention to remedy all'unfair judgments.s The
aim of affirmative action is more modest; it seeks to extinguish
only those irrational discriminations that can be assumed to occur
regularly. Such frequently made discriminations are easily identified because society is stratified along the lines of such discriminations. This is a fair induction; it takes little reflection on the
distribution of wealth, jobs, and education in our society to know
that very often people are judging others on the basis of their
gender or the color of their skin. And such discriminations, when
employed to judge human ability or worthiness, are totally irrational, erroneous, and unjust. There is virtually no empirical evidence to suggest that race or sex per se has the slightest bearing
on overall ability or "worthiness." I conclude, therefore, that the
real problem addressed by affirmative action is that of irrational
discrimination.
II.

CAN AFFIRMATIvE ACTION BE ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED?

Affirmative action, in summary, is addressed to the problem
of certain widespread, irrational discriminations that result in social stratifications along lines of race and sex. Affirmative action
is a social intervention that seeks to alter our environment so as
to weaken or extinguish such discriminations, or at least to break
up the stratifications. Are such interventions ethically justified?
I answer this question in two steps: First, I determine the
ethical proposition upon which affirmative action proceeds; sec-

• This is so because it is neither possible to be absolutely certain of the criteria by which any particular judgment proceeds, nor would it be desirable to con-

struct a society which attempted to control sharply all irrational discriminations.
Cf. Morris, Punishment for Thoughts, 49 MoNIsT 342 (1965). Affirmative action

avoids both difficulties by focusing on eliminating certain types of irrational judgments rather than prohibiting particular irrational judgments.
I However, "society" makes this irrational distinction void of any empirical
evidence; this is what is being investigated in this essay. To claim that discriminations based on race and sex are valid because the objects of such discrimination
are socially inferior is tautological.
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ond, I assess whether the problem addressed by affirmative action
is sufficiently compelling so as to satisfy that ethical proposition.
This sort of two-step inquiry could be used to evaluate any sort of
remedy or social intervention. The method first determines the
severity and frequency of the intervention and then assesses
whether the problem to be solved is sufficiently serious to justify
that particular sort of intervention. For example, a given social
intervention might proceed according to the extreme ethical proposition that this intervention is always just. Such a proposition
is extreme because it sets no boundaries whatever on the frequency or legitimacy of the intervention. It does not, for example,
identify the persons upon whom it is proper to impose the expense, detriment, or punishment (hereinafter the "burden" of the
intervention) or identify the persons who properly deserve to
"benefit" by the intervention. Perhaps the closest example of a
social intervention that proceeds according to this extreme ethical
proposition is the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. All natural persons residing within our borders
"benefit" by this social intervention. But even the fourteenth
amendment could not technically be said to proceed according to
the ultimate ethical principal that intervention is always just.
This is because only the "states" (and, by interpretation, those
engaging in "state action") are subject to the burdens of the intervention. Hence, in describing the ethical justification of the
fourteenth amendment we need begin by searching for a somewhat weaker ethical proposition that is truly descriptive of the
class of those benefited and those burdened.
Other aspects of our legal system do not proceed on ethical
propositions as strong as those employed in assuring our basic
freedoms. The criminal justice system, to take another example,
obviously is quite careful to require the identification of particular persons to be burdened by the intervention of "punishment."
The ethical standard by which our criminal justice system operates is therefore weaker by its setting a more narrow, particularized constraint on its interventions. But the standard is still
rather strong, evidenced by the fact that the criminal justice system remains unconcerned with the specific identity of the persons
who will "benefit" by the punishment. Criminal justice will proceed even where the victim of the crime is dead. A proper statement of the ethical assumption of our criminal justice system reflects both this careful concern for the persons burdened, yet also
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a complete lack of concern for the persons benefited. As a final
example of this two-step analysis, consider tort law, in which society feels itself justified in intervention (requiring "compensation") only where it is assured that there is accurate, particularized identification of both the person to be burdened and the
person to be benefited, and that the amount of the benefit/burden is equal to, but no more than, that required to compensate
the injury. Tort law, therefore, proceeds from a relatively weak
ethical proposition. It follows from this that it is easy to identify
instances in tort law where, because of some error in this matching process, an injustice occurs. Interventions to compel compliance with the demands of equal protection and due process rights
are not so easily criticized because they proceed from such a
strong ethical proposition that the intervention is almost always
justified.
By what ethical proposition does the intervention of "affirmative action" proceed? Let us consider four possible candidates:
P1: Affirmative action is always just.
P2: Affirmative action is just if afforded to persons morally
deserving.
P3: Affirmative action is just if afforded to persons morally
deserving, at the expense of those with no moral rights to prevent it.
P4: Affirmative action is just if afforded to persons morally
deserving, at the expense of those responsible for, or benefiting from the injustice.
Affirmative action programs clearly do not proceed from an
ethical statement as strong as P1. Not all persons benefit by such
programs. Affirmative action programs identify as beneficiaries
only those persons who possess one or more particular genetic,
physiological or ethnic traits. The traits that serve to identify affirmative action benefits are chosen largely by popular wisdom
concerning the number, strength, and historical persistence of unjust discriminations that a given trait seems to stimulate. Not all
traits that are frequently the basis of unjust discrimination have
been recognized as worthy of affirmative action "benefit." One
thinks, for example, of "fatness" or "shortness" or "ugliness." We
are probably aware of widespread discrimination based on such
attributes, but they are not made the basis for affirmative action.
Perhaps this is because such attributes as "fatness" admit more
gradation than "female" or "blackness;" such attributes admit a
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certain degree of human control; or perhaps although such persons are deserving of special help, their interests are thought to
be outweighed by the interests of those who would be forced by
affirmative action to carry the burdens of their assistance. 10
On the other hand, affirmative action does not proceed from
a proposition as weak as P4. No attempt is made to determine
which particular persons of the "majority" populations are responsible for, or have benefited from, making unjust discriminations. There is a good practical reason for this. Indeed, if affirmative action could be justified by no stronger ethical principle than
P4, then for purely administrative reasons affirmative action programs could scarcely exist. P4 requires the particularized inquiries exemplified by tort law. Yet any attempt to particularize
affirmative action interventions would require extensive investigation into the current and past prejudices of every "majority" person. This would clearly lead to severe administrative costs and
complexity; moreover, the vagueness of the inquiry and the length
of time to be probed would result in unacceptable invasions of
privacy.
P2 or P3 must therefore be the assumption under which affirmative action proceeds. The difference between these two propositions regards allocation of burdens. P2 makes no inquiry as to
the proper bearer of the burden. P2 is the sort of standard that
underlies traditional social welfare programs which grant entitlements to certain beneficiaries, yet leave the burden to be borne
by the unparticularized taxpaying community. By contrast, P3
does require an inquiry into burden, specifying that any burden
must be borne only by such persons having no moral rights to
prevent it. P2 of course is a stronger ethical statement, having
less restrictions on its use; it therefore also requires more compelling discriminations to satisfy its requirements. Programs based
on the less drastic intervention of P3 can be justified by less compelling social needs. Because of the peculiar way in which the
burdens of affirmative action programs actually fall, it is particularly crucial to determine which of these two ethical propositions
actually governs affirmative action. As suggested, traditional social welfare programs impose burdens very broadly and progressively throughout the taxpaying community or the buying public.
10See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
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By contrast, the burdens of affirmative action fall quite narrowly
and with comparative severity on those particular candidates for
job advancement or educational admission whose credentials are
most marginal to those benefiting from the action. They, unlike
the factory owner responding. to labor legislation, cannot distribute their "expenses" among a wider group; they must bear
their burden alone. And they, unlike the taxpayer of a progressive
tax, often "pay" in inverse relation to their ability to afford the
hardship. The burdens of affirmative action are therefore undistributed and regressive. A proper ethical evaluation of affirmative
action must, therefore, give some thought to the interests of those
burdened. Were affirmative action to proceed according to P2,
with no regard to the rights of the persons so peculiarly burdened, affirmative action would be ethically suspect. If, on the
other hand, affirmative action proceeds by P3, which does consider the interests of the burdened persons, affirmative action
programs may well be ethically justified.
Does affirmative action consider the rights of the persons
burdened by it? At first blush, the answer is "no," and we are
forced to say that affirmative action is not ethically justified. But
closer examination reveals that such rights are, in a perhaps unconscious fashion, always considered. Although affirmative action
programs originate in several different contexts and vary considerably in detail, the programs share the feature that the burdens
fall randomly on those individuals with the most marginal qualifications. From this it appears that no consideration is made of the
burdened person's rights. This, however, is illusory because such
rights have been taken into account before the particular burdens
are allocated. The rights are considered at the time the program
is initiated, at the time of identification of the beneficiaries.Not
all persons "deserving" of special treatment are given it. Of the
many discriminations sufficiently common to lead to distinct
stratification, only two or three attributes are recognized for special help. The beneficiaries sometimes are limited for administrative reasons 1' but are also often limited because of the countervailing rights of the persons who would be burdened by the
affirmative action program. In other words, where deserving people are not given help, it is often because their claims have been

11See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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outweighed by the rights of the people potentially burdened. Affirmative action proceeds, therefore, according to the ethical standard of P3 rather than P2.
Having now established P3 as the ethical standard to be satisfied, the second step in evaluating the ethics of affirmative action interventions is to assess the moral gravity of the problem
addressed. P3 is a fairly strong ethical statement and is satisfied
only where the need or injury that causes us to say that certain
people are deserving of special consideration outweighs the rights
of the persons burdened. First, we will investigate why the victims of discrimination are deserving of special help. Then, we will
examine the interests of the "majority" persons who potentially
bear the burdens.
People are deserving of affirmative action when they possess
some trait that causes large numbers of other people to judge
them irrationally. This is so because irrational judgments are
"wrong" in two distinct senses. First, such judgments are "wrong"
in the sense of being inaccurate. Race and sex are simply irrelevant to judging a person's abilities or talents. Such a categorical
statement is difficult to prove however, since that proof would require disproving every alleged correlation between such traits and
all conceivable tAsks. That is probably impossible and certainly
beyond the scope of this paper. 12 Suffice it to say that even where
an adverse correlation is said to exist, and even where such correlation cannot be disproved, the cause of such correlation is as
likely cultural as biological or genetic. This, of course, means it is
brought on by the very discriminations we are investigating. Inaccurate appraisals of people's abilities based on race or sex deserve
to be corrected for two reasons. First, people in our culture have a
certain moral right to be judged according to their true abilities.18
Second, sheer utilitarian concerns demand that the refusal
to em14
ploy talents to their best use is inefficient and wasteful.
Irrational appraisals of an individual's worth are not merely
inaccurate; such appraisals are morally unfair. They are morally
"

See, e.g., A.M. SHUEY, THE TESTING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (2d ed. 1966).

See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
4See Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State Action Increasing Equality, 84 YALE L. J. 39 (1974). See also note 26 and accompanying

text infra.
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unfair because they are based on factors that are morally irrelevant. Race and gender are immutable genetic and physiological
characteristics for which their possessor has not the slightest responsibility, and over which neither he, nor anyone else, can exercise the slightest control. Hence, speaking of such characteristics
in terms of morality is as nonsensical as it would be to pass moral
judgment on the setting of the sun. Neither the circuit of the sun,
nor one's race, are in the realm of human discretion. Such things
are neither right nor wrong, good nor bad. To judge the worth of
individuals on the basis of race or sex is more than nonsense however; it is a moral injury. People have the right to be free from
moral judgments based on moral irrelevancies. This cannot be
controversial. It is the very essence of what it means to be treated
like a human being. If "human dignity" has any content it must
be that people should be judged by how they think and act, not
by the arrangement of their genes. 15 In short, certain persons are
deserving of special treatment because such persons have been
both inaccurately and unjustly judged. Their injuries are substantial, considering not only how such persons are regarded in the
community, but also their right to, and the community interest
in, the full use of their abilities.
To be balanced against such injuries are the moral rights of
"majority" persons to avoid the burdens of affirmative action.
What right might be said to prevent one from being singled out to
bear these substantial burdens? Such a right might be one of procedure, or substance, or both. The procedural moral right might
be that since no individual has been adjudicated guilty of the discrimination in question, any burden must be spread throughout
the whole majority population. This procedural concern will be
dealt with in the discussion below of the techniques of affirmative
action. More important here, however, is whether there exists any
substantive claim by which a person might assert moral immunity
from affirmative action. Any such claim must entail a right to be
judged for social advancement on the basis of one's individual
ability. Should our society recognize such a moral right? If so,
should it be of sufficient strength to immunize against all affirma15 See Hofstadter, supra note 1 at 141-42; Blackstone, Human Rights and

Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNTrY: Tis CENTURY AND NEXT 1, 3-37 (R. Gotesky
and E. Laszlo eds. 1970); Conkll, supra note 6 at 505-08; DWORKIN, supra note 1;
Lee, supra note 3.
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tive action burdens? By the following analysis, I conclude we
should recognize a moral right to use one's acquired abilities to
their fullest. That right, however, is not so compelling as to immunize one against all burdens of affirmative action.
One's "abilities" seem to be a ,combination of two things: (a)
one's native intelligence; and (b) one's acquired skills. First, it
seems to me that no moral rights ought to proceed from the mere
possession of native intelligence. "Intelligence," by whatever standard measured, results from a combination of genetic endowment
and early learning environment. 16 Both factors are wholly beyond
the control of the person whose intelligence is being shaped.
Therefore, native intelligence is morally irrelevant. It is absurd to
consider an innately intelligent person worthy of moral praise,
since obviously the person has done nothing to bring about such
intelligence.17 This is simply the converse of saying that a discrimination based on factors such as race or sex is morally unjust.
To the extent one's acquired skills are "unearned," in the sense of
being genetically or environmentally facilitated, such skills can
similarly not form the basis of any moral right. The degree of
such facilitation with respect to each skill is, of course, an empirical matter beyond our current investigative capabilities. Undoubtedly, some part of most acquired skills is due to the hard
work of the individual applying himself to the task. As to such
component, a person has a moral right to the opportunity to employ it for gain, self-identity, or even sheer pleasure. 18 To deny
this is to deny that the merit system has any ethical credibility
apart from the utilitarian efficiency redounding to a society that
embraces it.11
Yet of what strength is such moral right? It is sufficiently
strong to defeat some, but not all affirmative action claims.
Whether the rights of the potentially burdened persons are sufficiently strong to defeat such claims depends on the nature, feroc16 The precise mix of contribution to intelligence made by genetic endowment

and early learning environment is of course a matter of continuing debate. The
question is, however, irrelevant for purposes of this paper since both factors are
esentially beyond the control of the person whose intelligence is being measured.
:7 See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 44-58 (1972).
8 Cf. Plamenatz, Equality of Opportunity, in AsPEcTs OF HUMAN EQUALITY
79 (L. Bryson ed. 1956).
" See SARToR, supra note 3; Plamenatz, supra note 18.
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ity, and persistence of the discriminations endured. Common
sense can go a long way to defining the ethical boundaries of affirmative action. Consider, for example, "Irishness." There is no
question but that possessing "Irishness" in America has historically meant to suffer discrimination. Such discrimination is
clearly unjust, because "Irishness" is an attribute beyond one's
control and hence morally irrelevant.20 Legislation designed to
prevent any worsening of the discrimination is clearly justified.
But whether "Irishness" should be made the basis of an affirmative action program is a much more difficult inquiry. Because of
the rapid decline in the frequency and strength of "Irishness" discriminations, an affirmative action program based on the possession of "Irishness" is probably ethically illegitimate. On the other
hand, where the discrimination has persisted over several generations and is one in which a sizable portion of the majority population engage with at least moderate frequency and virulence, affirmative action can be ethically justified.
In summary, affirmative action proceeds by an ethical proposition that gives special treatment to those deserving, at the
expense of those who have no right to prevent the burden from
befalling them. Existing affirmative action programs attempt to
correct injuries of sufficient gravity to justify intervention even
where the intervention is carried out at the expense of those who
are thereby frustrated by being unable to fully exercise their right
to use their acquired skills. Clearly, not all affirmative action,
even that which is undertaken on behalf of deserving persons, is
just. But affirmative action on behalf of persons who suffer injury
from chronic, frequent and severe unjust discriminations is ethically just.
H.

DOES AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOY SUITABLE TECHNIQUES?

No social intervention should be evaluated without careful
examination of the "techniques" by which the intervention proceeds.21 Regardless of the ethical justification for acting on a
See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
TOOLS FOR CoNvVaLrrY (1973); M. POLANYI, THE
LOGic OF LmERTY 154-200 (1971); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes-A Plea for Process Values, 60 CORNELL L. Rlv. 1 (1974); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality,46 S. CAL. L. Rv. 617 (1973); Boyer, Alternative; to Administrative
20

21 See generally I. ILLICH,
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problem, a proposed solution that is erratic, clumsy, stifling, or
autocratic should be reconsidered. With this in mind, I will evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of existing affirmative action
programs by reference to two factors. First, I will consider their
accuracy in properly allocating benefits and burdens, and second,
their prospects for solving and preventing the recurrence of unjust discrimination.
Before considering these two factors, we should get a perspective on the technique of affirmative action by contrasting the
goals and methods of other possible social responses to discrimination.22 The techniques of affirmative action programs, as was
previously noted, are different from those of traditional social
welfare programs and also those designed to achieve "legal equality." "Legal equality" is an intervention intended to prevent the
worsening of social stratification by preventing the occurrence of
certain additional social action. "Legal equality" uses the relatively painless technique of articulating universally applicable
legal principles guaranteeing that henceforth no person shall suffer the consequences of any discrimination made on the basis of
race, creed, color, sex, age, ethnic origin, etc.23 Two things are significant about the very simple fashion in which "legal equality"
attempts to reach its goal of no worsening of inequality. First, the
technique can be simple because the goal is quite limited: It does
not seek to correct existing inequalities. Second, "legal equality"
is directed at preventing the consequences of unjust discrimination, not at preventing the making of such discrimination. Hence,
it is possible and not particularly ironic for a society to have "legal equality" with the universal prohibitory principles duly enacted into law, yet be both a badly stratified and highly racist or

Trial-type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 111 (1972).
:1 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
23 "Legal equality" properly speaking has this substantive, and also a procedural dimension. See Conklin, supra note 6; Friedrich, A Brief Discourse on the
Origin of PoliticalEquality, in NoMos IX: EQUALrrY 217 (J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1967); Adam, Isotes, or Equality Before the Law, in Aspnc.Ts OF HUMAN
EQuALrrY 151 (L. Bryson ed. 1956); KELSEN, supra note 3 at 439-40; R. GRAVESON,
STATUS IN T1E COMMON LAW (1953); Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. Rav. 941 (1971); R. UNOR, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: ToWRD A CMTIClSM OF SocIAL THEORY (1976). See also note 6 supra and citations
therein.
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sexist society. Also, "legal equality" is far less controversial than
affirmative action since implementing "legal equality" does not
entail the pain of redistributing scarce resources. The total
amount of social "protection under the law" can be prospectively
increased without taking any substantial resource from anyone.
Affirmative action, in contrast, is (a) corrective, seeking to
compensate past injuries; and (b) future directed, seeking ultimately to prevent both the effects and the making of discriminations. It proceeds correctively by redistributing certain opportunities. It also proceeds prospectively by attempting to change the
way people think, an ambitious goal not apparently shared by social welfare programs.2 4 The techniques employed by affirmative
actions are comparatively unorthodox and fairly drastic and
therefore fiercely resisted. But none of those qualities should suggest that the technique is unsuitable. As will be seen below, the
technique does contain some tension between opposing desirable
goals; on balance, however, the existing affirmative action programs are, perhaps as much by chance as by design, well-suited to
achieving the long-range goals of ending both the making and social effects of certain discriminations.
The first factor by which we can judge the suitability of the
affirmative action techniques is "accuracy." Basically, the "accuracy" of a given intervention technique depends on how precisely
it allocates benefits and burdens. The second factor, "effectiveness," is measured by how likely it is that the current problem is
solved and its recurrence prevented. Curiously, these two considerations seem opposed in affirmative action programs; the more
accurately a program allocates benefits, the less likely it is to
achieve its goals. This irony occurs because of a divergence in the
beneficiaries: Often the more a particular minority person's degree of injury or need of special assistance, the less potential such
person has in helping solve the ultimate problem. This point merits a bit of elaboration.
Affirmative action programs award special consideration to
certain people because such people share with others a physical,
11 Social welfare programs, in contrast to both "legal equality" and affirmative action programs, are a) corrective to end current needs; and b) make no visible effort to prevent either the making or the effects of future unjust discriminations. Cf. Rehbinder, supra note 23.
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genetic, or ethnic trait against which "society" discriminates.
However, society actually never discriminates against "groups";
discriminations are made against people. For administrative reasons, however, the beneficiaries of any affirmative action program
are identified by their mere possession of a particular discriminating trait. One is assumed by possession of the trait to have suffered injury from unjust discrimination. It is a convenience and
probably not much of a fiction. But within each "target group"
there are those persons who have suffered more, or less, injury
through unjust discrimination. Which persons are most deserving
o:F help? Clearly the most injured. A technique, therefore, that insured that those most deserving receive the most assistance would
be most "accurate." Yet would the technique thereby best serve
its goal of eliminating the cause of the problem, i.e. prevent the
making of future discriminations? I think not. The origin of the
problem is the existence of some inaccurate and unjust, yet commonly held, thought pattern such as "black = inferior." How
does one go about extinguishing such a thought pattern? The history of social welfare programs shows that the answer does not lie
in supplying people with commodities. In fact, it is conceivable
that such material redistributions actually reinforce the discrimination. For some "majority" persons, the acceptance of social welfare is in and of itself proof of the inferiority of the recipient. A
"welfare person" wears a label that perpetuates the unjust
thought pattern. The mental discrimination will be extinguished
only when larger numbers of people with the "inferior" trait
prove the irrationality and waste of the discrimination. They will
do that when, once selected for highly visible and demanding jobs
and study positions, they perform well, according to their true
abilities. Elevating people within the target group who are not capable of performing adequately to those positions would ultimately be counterproductive, however. Unsatisfactory performance would only perpetuate the thought pattern. It may well be
that those who, by virtue of greater injury, are concededly most
deserving are also the most able. But that would be a coincidence.
This tense competition within the aided group reflects the larger
social tension-the proper mix of resource "needs" redistribution
versus the meritorious. Affirmative action is caught between giving greatest benefits to the most able, and thereby perhaps damning the most needy to a lifetime of continued injury; or, alternately, compensating well the injuries suffered, but at the risk
that the underlying problem will never be solved. Thus far, af-
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firmative action has opted for the meritorious rather than
"needs" approach, thereby sacrificing accuracy in the hope of a
long-term cure.
The above discussion accounts for some of the volatility of
affirmative action. It arises from tensions of benefit allocation
even within the target group. When we turn to burden allocations, these tensions are even more pronounced. Recall that affirmative action burdens fall narrowly, yet with regressive severity, on "majority" candidates whose credentials are most
marginal. One further point is worth recalling. It could well be
that the person burdened is relatively, or even completely, innocent of making unjust discriminations. Can we justify burdening,
particularly in such a regressive way, a person who is basically
innocent of the unjust conduct? Regretfully, we can. When we
concluded above that (a) affirmative action proceeds by P3 rather
than P4; and that (b) affirmative action addresses problems "of
such gravity as to satisfy the ethical demands of P3,2 5 we were
also concluding that affirmative action burdens could be imposed
on people regardlessof whether they personally were responsible
for, or benefited from, the unjust discrimination. The matter is
one of rights generally of, "majority" persons-not the ethical
profiles of particular individuals. Hence, affirmative action is ethically justified even if a burden is imposed on one completely innocent of discrimination.
But that is no answer to the contention that the technique
employed by affirmative action would be more accurate, and
thereby arguably more fair, were the burdens to fall in some less
disagreeable way. Here again, there occurs a tension between the
accuracy and the long-term effectiveness of the program. Note we
are willing to aid a person who bears a certain trait on the evidence presented by social stratification that large numbers of people must unjustly discriminate against such trait. "Majority" people in general are, by induction, assumed to engage in unjust
discriminations. If that be our method, rather than the more
painstaking method of making particularized inquiries into who
in fact discriminates, would it not then be preferable to spread
any necessary burden as widely as possible; or, if the burden must
for some reason fall narrowly, to assign it by a truly random se25

See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
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lection? Either would in fact be a more accurate burden allocation than putting heaving burdens on the least qualified among
the "majority" population, unless there happens to be a strong
correlation between being a marginal candidate and engaging in
unjust discrimination. But since candidates can be marginal for
positions spread throughout the socio-economic range and since
persons predisposed to discrimination are no doubt similarly
spread, the correlation seems doubtful. The conclusion is inescapable that although existing systems are ethically justified, affirmative action programs allocate their burdens in a manner
much less accurate than they might.
This sacrifice of "burden accuracy", as with the sacrifice of
"benefit accuracy", is administratively convenient and serves the
goal of extinguishing the thought pattern that gives rise to discriimination. Full burden accuracy could be achieved only by legislating a system of "shared poverty" in which every "majority"
person is required to reduce somewhat the duties of his or her
position in order to make room for persons in the target group.
This clearly is administratively unworkable and would result in
severe decline in productivity. Hence, if affirmative action is to
exist, its burdens must fall narrowly. For every one person benefited, the burden occasioned thereby should be borne by no more
than one "majority" person.
However, must that unfortunate person be so regressively selected? Why not displace "majority" persons at random rather
than on the basis of the paucity of the credentials? Such a random system would be administratively awkward but not impossible. In any industrial or educational institution, a cross-section of
jobs or positions could be randomly selected for affirmative action
treatment. The persons in such positions would then be dismissed
or denied enrollment with no concern for their relative abilities.
Such a system is arguably more progressive. For example, a candidate with excellent credentials for admission into a professional
school might be randomly selected at one institution for denial of
admission in favor of a person from the target group. Due to his
or her excellent credentials, however, the denied candidate would
in all probability be admitted to some other institution. Burdens
under this sort of random system would be borne by persons better able to bear them. Yet existing programs have adopted the
more regressive means of allocating burdens. Perhaps two reasons
justify the current practice. First, utilitarian efficiency is better
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served by the existing programs. A random burden allocation
would result in the unemployment, or underutilization, of persons
of higher overall talent and therefore would result in more economic waste.2 6 Perhaps more important is the fact that the existing programs preserve as far as possible the merit system, both
in identifications of beneficiaries and in allocations of burdens.
This may simply reflect caution on the part of affirmative action
program designers. Perhaps they are seeking to obtain the most
political acceptance by tampering least with existing structures.
Retention of the meritorious structure may also be more substantive, in that administrators recognize the moral right of every person to be free to exercise his or her skills to the fullest. Where
people are chosen randomly to be deprived of such an opportunity, these moral rights are offended much more severely than
where the burdens fall on the least qualified.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Affirmative action programs are possessed of the genius of
common sense. They intervene in a limited number of our social
dealings on behalf of a limited number of persons, thus respecting
the rights of all. Their circumspection goes far to justifying their
moral worth. They tread lightly on their own logic, rewarding the
most able at the expense of the least qualified. One cannot escape, however, the fact that affirmative action presents some challenge to the merit system. That fact helps to explain why the affirmative action issue has led to a certain breakdown of the liberal
consensus. Most of us are reared on the American Dream that no
matter how humble a person's origins, any position is attainable
through hard work and the development of one's talents. The
core of affirmative action is that certain persons are given special
consideration for advancement and may thereby attain positions
ahead of other "more qualified" persons. There is much serious
debate on this issue, and it no doubt accounts for much of the
controversy over affirmative action. But something more accounts
for the virulence with which affirmative action is often attacked.
It is something most of us feel but adnit only reluctantly. Traditional wealth redistribution takes from the many and gives to the
needy few. It is charity and its recipients are so regarded. They
26

Cf. Baker, supra note 14.
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are the objects of our largesse. That is why traditional social welfare programs are basically compatible with the merit system.
Welfare recipients are not players-they must wear many badges
of their lower status and their children tend to inherit the badges.
Affirmative action engages in no such quid pro quo with its beneficiaries. Rather, affirmative action seeks to provide not immediate support, but rather long-term opportunity and true social mobility. It does this by affording to certain groups priority of
selection over random individuals. This is not the technique of
charity but of rights; its recipients are not wards of the State, but
people claiming the full respect owing to all human beings. Affi mative action asks of us that we give as friends might-as
equal, not as patrons. It is this, I feel, that causes us so much
pain; but it may well be the best, or perhaps the only, way by
which we can end unjust discrimination. And that goal is a worthy one. Once and for all we should be rid of another bit of irrationality that stands in the way of a mature civilization.
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